“Rapid dominance attempts to affect the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary to fight or respond to our strategic policy ends through imposing a regime of Shock and Awe”
(Ullman & Wade, 1996)
One could argue that “shock & awe” is a military strategy to specifically terrorize the enemy force, for example a military opponent. This would blur the line above (terrorism vs military) as it intends to affect the opponents minds with fear of the attacking group and thus coerce them away from their goal.
This strategy is one performed by an organized military that is (theoretically) bound by the rules of warfare (like the Geneva Convention) and unlawful acts can be prosecuted by either their own military law system or an international court (like the Hague). Non-state actors (insurgents, terrorist groups) on the other hand are not beholden to any law. To me, this is another relevant distinction:
Is the act itself one of terror or military necessity?
And is the actor a governmental organization beholden to the law?
One could argue that “shock & awe” is a military strategy to specifically terrorize the enemy force, for example a military opponent.
Indeed, and that’s why the definition hinges critically on the intended target (civilian vs. military). One could even argue that if you, as a civilian, see your nation’s military forces march out and get torn to ribbons, and then the next night your city’s sky is alive with enemy aircraft bombing military, government, or materiel targets, you have pretty good reason to be scared. But we wouldn’t call this terrorism, even if there are some civilian casualties, because the primary targets are all legitimate ones intended to hamper your ability to wage war.
This strategy is one performed by an organized military that is … bound by the rules of warfare … Non-state actors (insurgents, terrorist groups) on the other hand are not beholden to any law. To me, this is another relevant distinction
This is another good point. We nominally expect that organized nations will adhere to the laws and customs of war. More critically, non-state actors also tend to not have uniforms, stash materiel among civilian populations (often even on sites protected under said laws and customs), and deliberately introduce ambiguity as to whether a target is military or civilian.
But this logic can also get murky when we consider states not recognizing other governments or arguing they are “occupied” by another, more ephemeral hostile force. It can be advantageous for a state to portray their enemy as an ephemeral, non-state actor, in part because it lets you portray the enemy as not adhering to laws and customs of war.
“Rapid dominance attempts to affect the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary to fight or respond to our strategic policy ends through imposing a regime of Shock and Awe” (Ullman & Wade, 1996)
One could argue that “shock & awe” is a military strategy to specifically terrorize the enemy force, for example a military opponent. This would blur the line above (terrorism vs military) as it intends to affect the opponents minds with fear of the attacking group and thus coerce them away from their goal.
This strategy is one performed by an organized military that is (theoretically) bound by the rules of warfare (like the Geneva Convention) and unlawful acts can be prosecuted by either their own military law system or an international court (like the Hague). Non-state actors (insurgents, terrorist groups) on the other hand are not beholden to any law. To me, this is another relevant distinction: Is the act itself one of terror or military necessity? And is the actor a governmental organization beholden to the law?
Indeed, and that’s why the definition hinges critically on the intended target (civilian vs. military). One could even argue that if you, as a civilian, see your nation’s military forces march out and get torn to ribbons, and then the next night your city’s sky is alive with enemy aircraft bombing military, government, or materiel targets, you have pretty good reason to be scared. But we wouldn’t call this terrorism, even if there are some civilian casualties, because the primary targets are all legitimate ones intended to hamper your ability to wage war.
This is another good point. We nominally expect that organized nations will adhere to the laws and customs of war. More critically, non-state actors also tend to not have uniforms, stash materiel among civilian populations (often even on sites protected under said laws and customs), and deliberately introduce ambiguity as to whether a target is military or civilian.
But this logic can also get murky when we consider states not recognizing other governments or arguing they are “occupied” by another, more ephemeral hostile force. It can be advantageous for a state to portray their enemy as an ephemeral, non-state actor, in part because it lets you portray the enemy as not adhering to laws and customs of war.